This is how Bree Van De Kamp finally came to change her weekly routine, she still cleaned on Tuesdays, paid her bills on Wednesdays, and did her laundries on Thursdays, but her Fridays were now reserved for a meeting, a special meeting where she stood in front of people she didn’t know, and said things she didn’t believe, and afterwards Bree would come home and reward herself on the completion of another successful week.
这就是Bree Van De Kamp如何最终改变了自己的每周安排，她仍然在周二打扫卫生；在周三付帐单；在周四洗衣服，但每个周五她要参加一个特别会议，在会议上她站在一群陌生人面前说她自己都不相信的话，然后回到家中犒劳自己，祝贺完满成功的一周。
她是这样改变她一周的生活的，她仍然是周二打扫卫生，周三结算账单，周日洗衣服，但是周五呢，她要参加一个特殊的会议，在会议上，她站在陌生人前说一些她自己都不相信的事情，会议结束后，她回到家里奖励自己又度过一个成功的一周。
At that precise moment as Dr Hanson Mills was cutting yet another umbilical cord, other ties were being severed all over town, like the one between a child and a mother who didn't want him to grow up so quickly, or the one between a case of fine wine and a housewife who hadn't wanted to admit she had a problem, or the one between a women and the boyfriend who couldn't forgive her betrayal. The choice to separate from what we love is painful; the only thing worse is when someone we've trusted makes the choice for us.
Monday, May 31, 2010
世界上到处都是不太可能的友谊。它的产生是由于一个人特别需要帮助，而另一个人愿意伸出援助之手。当我们接受到这种友好的帮助时，我们意识到了这种友好行为的价值，这样，不管别人是否理解，就形成了一种联系。的确，不可能的友谊每天都出现，没有人对于她的理解多过于对孤单的理解，事实上，
Now and then we all need a little help, so we ask for small favors. But it's always best to be wary of those eager to come to our rescue. Because even the smallest of favors carries a price tag. Yes, everyone has an agenda, no matter what they may tell us...and in those rare instances where there is no ulterior motive; we're so taking aback that we may fail to recognize the truth - that a loving friend has just done us an enormous favor.
偶尔我们总会需要帮助，所以我们请别人帮点小忙。不过对那些急切想拯救我们的人最好要带着一颗机警的心。因为哪怕是最小的恩惠都是有价格的。是的，每个人心里都有一本帐，不管他们告诉我们什么。别有用心的人太多了，像好朋友帮了大忙这样的情况真是少之又少。我们过分的警觉导致我们失去了对真相的判断力。
有时，我们都需要一些帮助，因此我们寻求一些小帮助。但最好要提防那些愿意帮助我们的人。因为即使是最小的帮助也是有标价的。是的，每个人都有事情要做，不管他们怎么说，在这些罕见的例子里没有别的动机；我们很吃惊我们不能辨别真假---忠诚的朋友给了我们一个很大的帮助。
Now and then we all need a little help, so we ask for small favors. But it's always best to be wary of those eager to come to our rescue. Because even the smallest of favors carries a price tag. Yes, everyone has an agenda, no matter what they may tell us...and in those rare instances where there is no ulterior motive; we're so taking aback that we may fail to recognize the truth - that a loving friend has just done us an enormous favor.
偶尔我们总会需要帮助，所以我们请别人帮点小忙。不过对那些急切想拯救我们的人最好要带着一颗机警的心。因为哪怕是最小的恩惠都是有价格的。是的，每个人心里都有一本帐，不管他们告诉我们什么。别有用心的人太多了，像好朋友帮了大忙这样的情况真是少之又少。我们过分的警觉导致我们失去了对真相的判断力。
有时，我们都需要一些帮助，因此我们寻求一些小帮助。但最好要提防那些愿意帮助我们的人。因为即使是最小的帮助也是有标价的。是的，每个人都有事情要做，不管他们怎么说，在这些罕见的例子里没有别的动机；我们很吃惊我们不能辨别真假---忠诚的朋友给了我们一个很大的帮助。
Everyone understands the nature of war, we also understand that victory depends on the cards that we have been dealt. Some when faced with a bloody battle simply give in, but for some surrender is unacceptable, even though they know it would be a fight to the death.
每个人都清楚战争的本性，我们也知道胜利取决于我们打出的那些牌。有些人在面对血战会从容放弃；但是对某些人来说投降是无法接受的，尽管他们清楚面前的是决一死战。
每个人都知道战争的本质，也知道胜利取决于我们出的牌。在面对血战的时候，有的人直接选择投降，而有的人却不能接受投降，尽管他们知道可能会在战争中死去。
The world is filled with unlikely friendships. How did they begin, with one person desperately in need and another willing to lend a helping hand. When such kindness is offered, we are finally able to see the worth of those we have previously written off, and before we've known it, a bond has formed, regardless of whether others can understand it. Yes, unlikely friendships start up everyday, no one understands this more than the lonely, in fact, and it’s what they count on.
世界上到处都是不太可能的友谊。它们都是由一方迫切的需求和另一方伸出的援助之手开始的。当这样的帮助提供给我们的时候，我们才明白曾经失败的价值。在我们相识之前，一条纽带就已经把我们连接在一起了，不管别人能否理解。的确，不太可能的友谊每天都在发生，没有人能比孤独寂寞的人更了解这一点。事实上，不太可能发生的友谊就是他们的指望。
每个人都清楚战争的本性，我们也知道胜利取决于我们打出的那些牌。有些人在面对血战会从容放弃；但是对某些人来说投降是无法接受的，尽管他们清楚面前的是决一死战。
每个人都知道战争的本质，也知道胜利取决于我们出的牌。在面对血战的时候，有的人直接选择投降，而有的人却不能接受投降，尽管他们知道可能会在战争中死去。
The world is filled with unlikely friendships. How did they begin, with one person desperately in need and another willing to lend a helping hand. When such kindness is offered, we are finally able to see the worth of those we have previously written off, and before we've known it, a bond has formed, regardless of whether others can understand it. Yes, unlikely friendships start up everyday, no one understands this more than the lonely, in fact, and it’s what they count on.
世界上到处都是不太可能的友谊。它们都是由一方迫切的需求和另一方伸出的援助之手开始的。当这样的帮助提供给我们的时候，我们才明白曾经失败的价值。在我们相识之前，一条纽带就已经把我们连接在一起了，不管别人能否理解。的确，不太可能的友谊每天都在发生，没有人能比孤独寂寞的人更了解这一点。事实上，不太可能发生的友谊就是他们的指望。
Tuesday, May 25, 2010
The Growth Blog is a forum for you - the policy maker, the academic, the student, and the interested citizen of the world - to agree, disagree, or simply to engage current practitioners on policies and issues critical to development. This platform was inspired by the series of meetings that the Commission on Growth and Development held around the world over the course of the last two years. Of the many lessons that emerged in the deliberations, the one that stands out is that inclusive growth requires inclusive thinking, and inclusive discussion.
Policy Choices for Health and Education: A Little Economics Goes a Long Way
Submitted by Hoyt Bleakley on Tue, 06/23/2009 - 12:17.
At the University of Chicago, we often say that “a little economics goes a long way” in understanding a problem. Hopefully this post is an example of that motto. Here I set out a simple framework and use it to think about the economic impact of different human-capital policies.
A barebones economic theory of schooling gives a quite simple recommendation: attend school until the marginal benefit (MB, the blue curve below) equals the marginal cost (MC, the green curve). Like so much of economics, this can be seen as the intersection of two curves:
Policy Choices for Health and Education: A Little Economics Goes a Long Way
Submitted by Hoyt Bleakley on Tue, 06/23/2009 - 12:17.
At the University of Chicago, we often say that “a little economics goes a long way” in understanding a problem. Hopefully this post is an example of that motto. Here I set out a simple framework and use it to think about the economic impact of different human-capital policies.
A barebones economic theory of schooling gives a quite simple recommendation: attend school until the marginal benefit (MB, the blue curve below) equals the marginal cost (MC, the green curve). Like so much of economics, this can be seen as the intersection of two curves:
On the other hand, there are large returns from improving the productivity of human-capital investments. In other words, we should try to make learning more productive. This is like shifting up the whole marginal-benefits curve, which would result in a first-order increase in income. But how can we do this? Some ideas:
* Control tropical disease. My earlier post on tropical parasites (hookworm and malaria) discusses this. The burden of these diseases weighs heavily on children, who are listless and anemic as a result. This can stunt growth and hold back learning (shifting MB down). Historical experience shows that hundred-year-old technology can be used to combat these parasites.
* Supplement nutrition at critical junctures. Poor nutrition can also hold back learning, especially if certain micro-nutrients are missing during critical periods in growth. Advances in this area, such as that of Nevin Scrimshaw, has shown remarkable impacts using very cheap supplements.
* Improve the quality of school. This sounds daunting in principle, but there are small, do-able things that could have large effects. For example, teacher absenteeism is a big problem in the developing world, in part because schools are in far flung places where monitoring is hard. But Esther Duflo, Rema Hanna and Stephen Ryan found experimentally that teachers are more likely to show up (and teach!) if you give them a cheap disposable camera and tie their salary to showing up in a picture of the class each day.
To sum up, there are potentially big gains from improving the quality of the childhood environment, but we should not expect so much from simply jacking up the quantity of time in school.
* Control tropical disease. My earlier post on tropical parasites (hookworm and malaria) discusses this. The burden of these diseases weighs heavily on children, who are listless and anemic as a result. This can stunt growth and hold back learning (shifting MB down). Historical experience shows that hundred-year-old technology can be used to combat these parasites.
* Supplement nutrition at critical junctures. Poor nutrition can also hold back learning, especially if certain micro-nutrients are missing during critical periods in growth. Advances in this area, such as that of Nevin Scrimshaw, has shown remarkable impacts using very cheap supplements.
* Improve the quality of school. This sounds daunting in principle, but there are small, do-able things that could have large effects. For example, teacher absenteeism is a big problem in the developing world, in part because schools are in far flung places where monitoring is hard. But Esther Duflo, Rema Hanna and Stephen Ryan found experimentally that teachers are more likely to show up (and teach!) if you give them a cheap disposable camera and tie their salary to showing up in a picture of the class each day.
To sum up, there are potentially big gains from improving the quality of the childhood environment, but we should not expect so much from simply jacking up the quantity of time in school.
At low levels of schooling (the left side of the graph), the marginal benefit is high: you are learning skills—the alphabet, for example—that your brain can digest and that have a high payoff in society. At the same time, the marginal cost—the opportunity cost of foregone earnings—is low: even if it’s legal for them to work, six-year-old kids are not very productive in the labor market. The early years of primary school, by this calculation, have a much higher benefit than cost. As you grow up, however, your potential wage grows, and thus the marginal cost of schooling rises. All the while, the marginal benefit declines with more time in school, your brain being less adept at learning the now-more-esoteric subjects. But you should stay in school as long at the marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost. However, there comes a point at which the marginal cost of staying in school is greater than the marginal benefits, and going to school past that point is a losing proposition. Optimally, you should stop just before this happens: when marginal benefits precisely equal marginal costs, denoted by the dashed line in the figure.
Now, let’s think about some policies...
Compelling, tricking, or bribing people to spend more years in school does so when the gains from schooling have been largely exhausted. (Numerous fashionable policy initiatives do this to some extent. I won’t name names.) You can see this in the graph: those last years of schooling (just to the left of the dashed line) come after the gap between MB and MC has mostly disappeared. In fact, policies that bump you to either side of your optimal choice will have small effects on lifetime income. The poor will still be poor, albeit with different amounts of education than they would have had otherwise. This, too, is seen in the graph. At the optimal choice of schooling, you are just indifferent between attending and dropping out, because marginal benefit equals marginal cost. It follows that if you attend a little more or a lit less instead of your optimal plan, well... marginal benefit is still pretty close to marginal cost. To a first approximation, you don’t lose much lifetime income by attending a little bit more or little bit les school. (Students of 1st-year grad economics will recognize this as the ‘envelope condition’: once you’ve optimized something, small deviations from your optimal plan have small only effects.)
Now, let’s think about some policies...
Compelling, tricking, or bribing people to spend more years in school does so when the gains from schooling have been largely exhausted. (Numerous fashionable policy initiatives do this to some extent. I won’t name names.) You can see this in the graph: those last years of schooling (just to the left of the dashed line) come after the gap between MB and MC has mostly disappeared. In fact, policies that bump you to either side of your optimal choice will have small effects on lifetime income. The poor will still be poor, albeit with different amounts of education than they would have had otherwise. This, too, is seen in the graph. At the optimal choice of schooling, you are just indifferent between attending and dropping out, because marginal benefit equals marginal cost. It follows that if you attend a little more or a lit less instead of your optimal plan, well... marginal benefit is still pretty close to marginal cost. To a first approximation, you don’t lose much lifetime income by attending a little bit more or little bit les school. (Students of 1st-year grad economics will recognize this as the ‘envelope condition’: once you’ve optimized something, small deviations from your optimal plan have small only effects.)
The Administration proposes to allow all existing mortgages currently owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (F&F) to be refinanced at current market rates, as long as the loan balance does not exceed 105% of the current house value. The benefit is that borrowers will face substantially lower payments if their mortgage rate falls from, say, 6.5% to 5%. Two comments:
1) The plan is clever in that F&F already hold the default risk on these mortgages, and providing a lower contract rate actually reduces this risk.
2) The plans fails to recognize that whatever the borrower gains from a lower mortgage rate, the investor who was holding the old mortgage loses. It is thus a complete wash in terms of overall spending power in the economy. Of course, you may feel more kindly to borrowers than to investors, but remember that the investors may well include your pension account, your bond fund, and your local bank.
Using Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to Buy Mortgages and Mortgage Securities
The goal here is to lower mortgage interest rates by using F&F to purchase mortgage securities. Two comments:
1) We are told nothing about which mortgage securities and at what prices the purchases are to be made. It seems that F&F are now basically bankrupt, so any further losses for the firms really come at the expense of the US Treasury and taxpayers. This is not a free lunch, and again it must be asked if this is the best use of scarce Treasury resources?
2) The plan’s goal here is to lower mortgage rates by buying mortgages funded with new Treasury securities. The transactions will surely narrow the spread between mortgages and Treasuries. But this could raise Treasury rates as much as it lowers mortgage rates. Raising Treasury borrowing rates is incredibly expensive, because all new Treasury debt must pay the new higher interest rate. Is buying mortgages the best use of Treasury resources?
1) The plan is clever in that F&F already hold the default risk on these mortgages, and providing a lower contract rate actually reduces this risk.
2) The plans fails to recognize that whatever the borrower gains from a lower mortgage rate, the investor who was holding the old mortgage loses. It is thus a complete wash in terms of overall spending power in the economy. Of course, you may feel more kindly to borrowers than to investors, but remember that the investors may well include your pension account, your bond fund, and your local bank.
Using Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to Buy Mortgages and Mortgage Securities
The goal here is to lower mortgage interest rates by using F&F to purchase mortgage securities. Two comments:
1) We are told nothing about which mortgage securities and at what prices the purchases are to be made. It seems that F&F are now basically bankrupt, so any further losses for the firms really come at the expense of the US Treasury and taxpayers. This is not a free lunch, and again it must be asked if this is the best use of scarce Treasury resources?
2) The plan’s goal here is to lower mortgage rates by buying mortgages funded with new Treasury securities. The transactions will surely narrow the spread between mortgages and Treasuries. But this could raise Treasury rates as much as it lowers mortgage rates. Raising Treasury borrowing rates is incredibly expensive, because all new Treasury debt must pay the new higher interest rate. Is buying mortgages the best use of Treasury resources?
The loan modification plan sets a target of 31% for the ratio of loan payments to income on modified mortgages, and provides numerous government subsidies to motivate borrowers, lenders, and servicers to carry out successful modifications. I have 3 comments:
1) Why are we subsidizing loan modification? To bailout those that made a poor real estate investment? Remember, those borrowers can start over in a rental unit at a relatively low cost. Pensioners who just lost their life savings or lower-income renters who just lost their job might be deemed even more worthy of government support?
2) The Administration plan has not solved the existing technical problems that doomed past plans to failure. As one example, 2nd mortgages remain a fundamental impediment to successful modification because the 2nd lien holder takes the benefits from the lender. The Administration plan requires the 2nd lien holder to concede, but they have no motive to do so.
On this basis, I expect a low take-up rate on the plan in general, and a high reoccurrence of default just as was the disappointing experience with past plans.
3) The main new wrinkle in the Administration plan is to throw subsidy money—lots of subsidy money--at the problem. This is the same principle that allowed the FDIC program to have some success. But is subsiding defaulting borrowers the best current use of taxpayer money? Do the benefits exceeds the costs?
1) Why are we subsidizing loan modification? To bailout those that made a poor real estate investment? Remember, those borrowers can start over in a rental unit at a relatively low cost. Pensioners who just lost their life savings or lower-income renters who just lost their job might be deemed even more worthy of government support?
2) The Administration plan has not solved the existing technical problems that doomed past plans to failure. As one example, 2nd mortgages remain a fundamental impediment to successful modification because the 2nd lien holder takes the benefits from the lender. The Administration plan requires the 2nd lien holder to concede, but they have no motive to do so.
On this basis, I expect a low take-up rate on the plan in general, and a high reoccurrence of default just as was the disappointing experience with past plans.
3) The main new wrinkle in the Administration plan is to throw subsidy money—lots of subsidy money--at the problem. This is the same principle that allowed the FDIC program to have some success. But is subsiding defaulting borrowers the best current use of taxpayer money? Do the benefits exceeds the costs?
for stabilizing the mortgage and housing markets consists of three basic components:
1) To encourage loan modifications for mortgages on the brink of foreclosure.
2) To expand the mortgage refinancing option for loans that are not otherwise eligible.
3) To lower mortgage interest rates through increase purchases by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (hereafter F&F).
I begin with a discussion of the overall goals and then turn to the specific proposals.
Absence of Overall Goals
Perhaps the plan’s greatest weakness is the failure to state the overall goals. One-off, ad hoc, remedies for a specific problem can fail for many reasons, including::
1) The proposals are made without any benefit/cost analysis. Taxpayers naturally wonder whether the benefits are worth the costs.
2) The programs are presented without any sense of a budget constraint. Even in a deep recession, resources have costs and allocations should represent priorities based on the benefits and costs of each proposal.
These concerns show up clearly in my questions on the specific proposals, to which I turn.
1) To encourage loan modifications for mortgages on the brink of foreclosure.
2) To expand the mortgage refinancing option for loans that are not otherwise eligible.
3) To lower mortgage interest rates through increase purchases by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (hereafter F&F).
I begin with a discussion of the overall goals and then turn to the specific proposals.
Absence of Overall Goals
Perhaps the plan’s greatest weakness is the failure to state the overall goals. One-off, ad hoc, remedies for a specific problem can fail for many reasons, including::
1) The proposals are made without any benefit/cost analysis. Taxpayers naturally wonder whether the benefits are worth the costs.
2) The programs are presented without any sense of a budget constraint. Even in a deep recession, resources have costs and allocations should represent priorities based on the benefits and costs of each proposal.
These concerns show up clearly in my questions on the specific proposals, to which I turn.
I did not put high saving and investment in the Washington consensus for the same reason that I omitted monetary policy: that I did not regard past erroneous beliefs about them as being at the core of Latin America’s problems in 1989. Obviously I agree that they matter too. In fact, my view is that the danger here is the opposite to that discussed above: that people will take to an extreme recent comments downplaying the importance of high investment in fueling high growth. To recognize that there are other factors involved should not entitle one to dismiss the importance of high savings and investment.
Several elements of my version of the Washington consensus were directed at providing market-oriented incentives: financial liberalization, trade liberalization (again), deregulation, and privatization. Dani Rodrik would, I think, argue that one can advocate the end without endorsing the particular means that I identified. In principle he may be right, but I find it difficult to envisage a market-oriented system in which loans are given to those endorsed by the state, imports require a quota, entry is limited to those who get approval, and the state is itself a competitor. It seems to me that once one joins him in recognizing a need for market-oriented incentives then one is pretty much committed to endorsing the means that I identified. Once again, market-oriented incentives were not a central feature of recommendations made by an earlier generation of development economists: we used to think it quaint of Peter Bauer to argue that peasants would respond to market incentives. We were wrong; Dani Rodrik is right; and the original version of the Washington consensus recognized this change in our outlook.
I confess that I did not incorporate much about the need for reasonably good governance in my 1989-vintage attempt to identify the measure of agreement on what was good for development. Maybe it should have been obvious in 1989, but it was only in the 1990s that this became a part of common discourse.
The Washington consensus sounded right wingbecause it criticize policies of inward orientation, macroeconomic sloppiness, and state intervention which had become associated with the left. These policies are ill suited to advance the interests of the underprivileged, which is in my view the abiding cause of the left, but appearances were, for better or worse, decisive. The Washington consensus was not right wing in the sense that it advocated policies that would have jeopardized the interests of the poor. If it is now regarded in the way that many people appear to do then it inevitably will be a far more political manifesto than was intended. But that is no excuse for denying that the original consensus recognized a profound change in views of what was calculated to promote development. The irony is that critics like Stiglitz and Rodrik agree with the change of views but, for whatever reason, deny any change.
Several elements of my version of the Washington consensus were directed at providing market-oriented incentives: financial liberalization, trade liberalization (again), deregulation, and privatization. Dani Rodrik would, I think, argue that one can advocate the end without endorsing the particular means that I identified. In principle he may be right, but I find it difficult to envisage a market-oriented system in which loans are given to those endorsed by the state, imports require a quota, entry is limited to those who get approval, and the state is itself a competitor. It seems to me that once one joins him in recognizing a need for market-oriented incentives then one is pretty much committed to endorsing the means that I identified. Once again, market-oriented incentives were not a central feature of recommendations made by an earlier generation of development economists: we used to think it quaint of Peter Bauer to argue that peasants would respond to market incentives. We were wrong; Dani Rodrik is right; and the original version of the Washington consensus recognized this change in our outlook.
I confess that I did not incorporate much about the need for reasonably good governance in my 1989-vintage attempt to identify the measure of agreement on what was good for development. Maybe it should have been obvious in 1989, but it was only in the 1990s that this became a part of common discourse.
The Washington consensus sounded right wingbecause it criticize policies of inward orientation, macroeconomic sloppiness, and state intervention which had become associated with the left. These policies are ill suited to advance the interests of the underprivileged, which is in my view the abiding cause of the left, but appearances were, for better or worse, decisive. The Washington consensus was not right wing in the sense that it advocated policies that would have jeopardized the interests of the poor. If it is now regarded in the way that many people appear to do then it inevitably will be a far more political manifesto than was intended. But that is no excuse for denying that the original consensus recognized a profound change in views of what was calculated to promote development. The irony is that critics like Stiglitz and Rodrik agree with the change of views but, for whatever reason, deny any change.
The first thing about which everyone agrees is engagement in the global economy. What I named in my original espousal of the Washington consensus as agreed policies for engaging in the global economy did not include capital account liberalization, but covered trade liberalization, the removal of barriers to the entry of FDI, and the maintenance of a competitive exchange rate. As conceded above, to believe the latter was uncontroversial was wrong (though Dani Rodrik himself might agree with it), but does he really think there would nowadays be a lot of controversy about the desirability of liberalizing rather than restricting trade? Does he think this would have been agreed by the architects of India’s import substitution policies, or by the average cepalista economist of the 1960s, even if one adds all sorts of qualifications about the speed of liberalization? Has there, in other words, not been a revolution in economic thought in this area, of which he is part?
Dani Rodrik says that all successful economies maintain macroeconomic stability. Reflecting the position in Latin America in 1989, I wrote in the Washington consensus of the need to maintain fiscal discipline, and to emphasize that this did not necessarily imply cutting expenditure I mentioned also the desirability of tax reform and of spending more wisely. If I had been writing the timeless piece that seems to have dominated the mind of critics, I would have been bound to write about monetary policy too, but the problems of Latin America in 1989 did not seem to me to stem primarily from inadequate monetary policies. But did the influential apologists for inflation known as the Latin American structuralist school regard it as distastefully as Rodrik evidently does? I know little of Turkish economic history, but presumably Turkey’s frequent bursts of sharp inflation occurred because some of his kin disagreed also with Rodrik’s judgment of the importance of macroeconomic stability. His view is the modern one, not one that has always dominated development economics.
Dani Rodrik says that all successful economies maintain macroeconomic stability. Reflecting the position in Latin America in 1989, I wrote in the Washington consensus of the need to maintain fiscal discipline, and to emphasize that this did not necessarily imply cutting expenditure I mentioned also the desirability of tax reform and of spending more wisely. If I had been writing the timeless piece that seems to have dominated the mind of critics, I would have been bound to write about monetary policy too, but the problems of Latin America in 1989 did not seem to me to stem primarily from inadequate monetary policies. But did the influential apologists for inflation known as the Latin American structuralist school regard it as distastefully as Rodrik evidently does? I know little of Turkish economic history, but presumably Turkey’s frequent bursts of sharp inflation occurred because some of his kin disagreed also with Rodrik’s judgment of the importance of macroeconomic stability. His view is the modern one, not one that has always dominated development economics.
The point I was trying to make in the original Washington consensus was not that Friedman, Hayek, Thatcher, and Reagan were really right and Stiglitz and his pals are really wrong. As a matter of fact I find it easy to name specific issues on which I differ sharply from Friedman et al—the impropriety of governmental attempts to influence income distribution, constant growth of some concept of the money supply, bipolar exchange rate regimes, etc. In contrast, there are rather few concrete issues on which I disagree with Stiglitz—only, to the best of my knowledge, his willingness to tolerate high inflation and his hostility to inflation targeting. The point I sought to make was, rather, that there was now a wide enough measure of agreement on certain basic issues and how to achieve them as to remove these topics from the need for active debate. We could all agree on the need for macroeconomic stability, integrating into the world economy, and using the market. It seems that I was wrong in thinking that this is widely held, but it was the belief that in the post-Berlin Wall age these were commonly shared values that motivated what I called the Washington consensus.
In fact, it seems to me that these ideas are overwhelmingly held by economists. To take a recent example, Dani Rodrik (who is not noted for his enthusiastic espousal of the Washington consensus) wrote
…successful economies...all engage in the global economy, maintain macroeconomic stability, stimulate saving and investment, provide market-oriented incentives, and are reasonably well governed.
In fact, it seems to me that these ideas are overwhelmingly held by economists. To take a recent example, Dani Rodrik (who is not noted for his enthusiastic espousal of the Washington consensus) wrote
…successful economies...all engage in the global economy, maintain macroeconomic stability, stimulate saving and investment, provide market-oriented incentives, and are reasonably well governed.
Of the four issues that are often regarded as constituting the acid tests dividing laissez-faire economists who are in favor of the Washington consensus from dirigistes who oppose it, it is only on industrial policy that my position is regarded as pro. Yes, I do believe that bureaucrats are capable of thought and that they should be encouraged to think, including what is in the interest of stimulating industrial growth, but I doubt if there are many circumstances in which their choices between investment options will be sounder than those who are risking their own money in a venture. So while I am all in favor of governments acting to make their countries attractive to innovation and private investment, I have little use for their “picking winners”.
But on three of the four critical issues my position is contrary to common views of what is recommended by the Washington consensus. The version that is apparently commonly held is closer to the version that Joe Stiglitz has propagated rather than the version I had in mind. Let me repress my discomfort at being vanquished, and my doubts as to whether a collective Washington ever believed all the things attributed to it in this interpretation, but I still wish to argue that this interpretation misunderstands what I was trying to assert.
But on three of the four critical issues my position is contrary to common views of what is recommended by the Washington consensus. The version that is apparently commonly held is closer to the version that Joe Stiglitz has propagated rather than the version I had in mind. Let me repress my discomfort at being vanquished, and my doubts as to whether a collective Washington ever believed all the things attributed to it in this interpretation, but I still wish to argue that this interpretation misunderstands what I was trying to assert.
One technique which one can hope to use to control capital movements without resorting to floating the exchange rate is to vary interest rates as in the original proposals for crawling pegs. An alternative is not to abandon capital controls while a country is still developing but to be prepared if necessary to discourage either inflows or outflows of capital (see the excellent quote by Pedro Pablo Kuczynski on p.52 of the Spence Commission report). But the Washington consensus has sometimes been interpreted as forbidding any government interferences in the free flow of capital, so Williamson was again a heretic. While I coined the phrase, it is commonly used in a sense other than that I had in mind.
On privatization, my paper said baldly that “state enterprises should be privatized”. One can interpret that as a dogmatic assertion that no state enterprise should be allowed to exist, and this doubtless seems to be a natural interpretation to those who regard the Washington consensus as stating a set of principles that apply always and everywhere. Or one can recognize that the paper I wrote was addressed to Latin America in 1989, and interpret it as asserting that every country in Latin America then had a range of enterprises under government management that would be better run in the private sector. Since there were many state enterprises in those days that were not utilities by any stretch of the imagination, this is consistent with recognition that in some utilities externalities or distributional concerns are important, and that the most efficient way of taking them into account may involve public ownership. If the Washington consensus is interpreted as adopting the first position and the second is Williamson’s, I am once again against the Washington consensus.
On privatization, my paper said baldly that “state enterprises should be privatized”. One can interpret that as a dogmatic assertion that no state enterprise should be allowed to exist, and this doubtless seems to be a natural interpretation to those who regard the Washington consensus as stating a set of principles that apply always and everywhere. Or one can recognize that the paper I wrote was addressed to Latin America in 1989, and interpret it as asserting that every country in Latin America then had a range of enterprises under government management that would be better run in the private sector. Since there were many state enterprises in those days that were not utilities by any stretch of the imagination, this is consistent with recognition that in some utilities externalities or distributional concerns are important, and that the most efficient way of taking them into account may involve public ownership. If the Washington consensus is interpreted as adopting the first position and the second is Williamson’s, I am once again against the Washington consensus.
It seems that the deliberations of the Spence Commission once again involved discussion of the merits of my child (her illegitimate brother, according to my daughter) the Washington consensus. It seems also that my intellectual position on three crucial policy issues put me at odds with a common conception of the Washington Consensus. The three issues are exchange rate policy, capital controls, and privatization.
On exchange rates, I have long favored intermediate regimes to fixed or floating rates, on the grounds that there are other objectives besides avoiding speculative crises, notably avoiding Dutch disease, and that one can tame capital movements by other techniques than allowing exchange rates to float. The Washington consensus has sometimes been interpreted as implying support for the bipolar position that one has to fix or float and cannot logically do anything in between: see, for example, Dani Rodrik’s augmented Washington consensus. So Williamson is against the Washington consensus, certainly in its augmented version.
On exchange rates, I have long favored intermediate regimes to fixed or floating rates, on the grounds that there are other objectives besides avoiding speculative crises, notably avoiding Dutch disease, and that one can tame capital movements by other techniques than allowing exchange rates to float. The Washington consensus has sometimes been interpreted as implying support for the bipolar position that one has to fix or float and cannot logically do anything in between: see, for example, Dani Rodrik’s augmented Washington consensus. So Williamson is against the Washington consensus, certainly in its augmented version.
Monday, May 17, 2010
How to convert m4v to wmv easily and quickly?
M4V to WMV united all the conversion functions which make users easily convert any video/audio files protected by m4v to wmvDRM. As we know, some formats are protected by DRM, so that the general software do not surport to convert such files. However, for this M4V to WMV Converter, it is really a small case to remove DRM protection.
As an all-in-one software, M4V to WMV can not be only used as a DRM removal, but can also used as a general video converter, HD video converter. Because the professional M4V to WMV Converter provide you so many functions that it is easy for you to convert video to video, video to audio, general video to HD video, HD video to general video, extract audio from video, etc.
The is really a simple software to run, to customize output files, you are allowed to use its edit functions freely. The interface is simple, but the funciton of M4V to WMV is powerful. Only will you free download and have a try of it, you can see how wonderful it is! If you happenly want to convert M4V to WMV or other mainstream video formats, I highly recommend this M4V to WMV to you!
* Remove DRM from protected video files. As a video lover, you must get bothered by removing DRM from WMV/WMA/M4P/M4V/M4A/M4B/ASF, etc. With this M4V to WMV Converter, no matter you are professional or not, you can finish it perfectly.
* Surporting both general videos and HD videos. Also act as a powerful video converter, M4V to WMV can also help users convert videos of diffierent formats to other mainstream formats for enjoyment. Even HD video format is surported.
* Extract audio from video. M4V to WMV Converter is also designed for users to extract lovely audios from current video as different audio formats, including MP3, WAV, M4A, WMA, OGG, AAC, APE, FLAC, AIFF, AU, MKA, AC3...
* Convert videos and audio to multiple portable devices. If you want to share your fancy video/audio on the fashionable portable device, do not worry, this M4V to WMV can do you a great help.
* Convert efficiently. M4V to WMV Converter is so efficient that it can convert M4V to WMV with superfast speed and 1:1 quality of original files.
As an all-in-one software, M4V to WMV can not be only used as a DRM removal, but can also used as a general video converter, HD video converter. Because the professional M4V to WMV Converter provide you so many functions that it is easy for you to convert video to video, video to audio, general video to HD video, HD video to general video, extract audio from video, etc.
The is really a simple software to run, to customize output files, you are allowed to use its edit functions freely. The interface is simple, but the funciton of M4V to WMV is powerful. Only will you free download and have a try of it, you can see how wonderful it is! If you happenly want to convert M4V to WMV or other mainstream video formats, I highly recommend this M4V to WMV to you!
* Remove DRM from protected video files. As a video lover, you must get bothered by removing DRM from WMV/WMA/M4P/M4V/M4A/M4B/ASF, etc. With this M4V to WMV Converter, no matter you are professional or not, you can finish it perfectly.
* Surporting both general videos and HD videos. Also act as a powerful video converter, M4V to WMV can also help users convert videos of diffierent formats to other mainstream formats for enjoyment. Even HD video format is surported.
* Extract audio from video. M4V to WMV Converter is also designed for users to extract lovely audios from current video as different audio formats, including MP3, WAV, M4A, WMA, OGG, AAC, APE, FLAC, AIFF, AU, MKA, AC3...
* Convert videos and audio to multiple portable devices. If you want to share your fancy video/audio on the fashionable portable device, do not worry, this M4V to WMV can do you a great help.
* Convert efficiently. M4V to WMV Converter is so efficient that it can convert M4V to WMV with superfast speed and 1:1 quality of original files.
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